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Abstract
We consider the problem of binary prediction with expert advice in settings where experts have
agency and seek to maximize their credibility. This paper makes three main contributions. First, it
defines a model to reason formally about settings with selfish experts, and demonstrates that “incentive
compatible” (IC) algorithms are closely related to the design of proper scoring rules. Designing a good IC
algorithm is easy if the designer’s loss function is quadratic, but for other loss functions, novel techniques
are required. Second, we design IC algorithms with good performance guarantees for the absolute loss
function. Third, we give a formal separation between the power of online prediction with selfish experts
and online prediction with honest experts by proving lower bounds for both IC and non-IC algorithms.
In particular, with selfish experts and the absolute loss function, there is no (randomized) algorithm for
online prediction—IC or otherwise—with asymptotically vanishing regret.
1 Introduction
In the months leading up to elections and referendums, a plethora of pollsters try to figure out how the
electorate is going to vote. Different pollsters use different methodologies, reach different people, and
may have sources of random errors, so generally the polls don’t fully agree with each other. Aggregators
such as Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight, The Upshot by the New York Times, and HuffPost Pollster by the
Huffington Post consolidate these different reports into a single prediction, and hopefully reduce random
errors.1 FiveThirtyEight in particular has a solid track record for their predictions, and as they are transparent
about their methodology we use them as a motivating example in this paper. To a first-order approximation,
they operate as follows: first they take the predictions of all the different pollsters, then they assign a weight
to each of the pollsters based on past performance (and other factors), and finally they use the weighted
average of the pollsters to run simulations and make their own prediction.2
But could the presence of an institution that rates pollsters inadvertently create perverse incentives for
the pollsters? The FiveThirtyEight pollster ratings are publicly available.3 The ratings can be interpreted as
a reputation, and a low rating can negatively impact future revenue opportunities for a pollster. Moreover, it
has been demonstrated in practice that experts do not always report their true beliefs about future events.
For example, in weather forecasting there is a known “wet bias,” where consumer-facing weather forecasters
deliberately overestimate low chances of rain (e.g. a 5% chance of rain is reported as a 25% chance of rain)
because people don’t like to be surprised by rain [Bickel and Kim, 2008].
∗Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, 474 Gates Building, 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305. This
research was supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1215965. Email: tim@cs.stanford.edu.
†Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, 482 Gates Building, 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305. This
research was supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1215965. Email: okkes@cs.stanford.edu.
1FiveThirtyEight: https://fivethirtyeight.com/, The Upshot: https://www.nytimes.com/section/upshot, HuffPost Poll-
ster: http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster.
2This is of course a simplification. FiveThirtyEight also uses features like the change in a poll over
time, the state of the economy, and correlations between states. See https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
how-fivethirtyeight-calculates-pollster-ratings/ for details. Our goal in this paper is not to accurately model all
of the fine details of FiveThirtyEight (which are anyways changing all the time). Rather, it is to formulate a general model of
prediction with experts that clearly illustrates why incentives matter.
3https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/pollster-ratings/
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These examples motivate the development of models of aggregating predictions that endow agency to the
data sources.4 While there are multiple models in which we can investigate this issue, a natural candidate
is the problem of prediction with expert advice. By focusing on a standard model, we abstract away from
the fine details of FiveThirtyEight (which are anyways changing all the time), which allows us to formulate
a general model of prediction with experts that clearly illustrates why incentives matter. In the classical
model [Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, Freund and Schapire, 1997], at each time step, several experts make
predictions about an unknown event. An online prediction algorithm aggregates experts’ opinions and makes
its own prediction at each time step. After this prediction, the event at this time step is realized and the
algorithm incurs a loss as a function of its prediction and the realization. To compare its performance against
individual experts, for each expert the algorithm calculates what its loss would have been had it always
followed the expert’s prediction. While the problems introduced in this paper are relevant for general online
prediction, to focus on the most interesting issues we concentrate on the case of binary events, and real-valued
predictions in [0, 1]. For different applications, different notions of loss are appropriate, so we parameterize
the model by a loss function `. Thus our formal model is: at each time step t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
1. Each expert i makes a prediction p(t)i ∈ [0, 1], with higher values indicating stronger advocacy for the
event “1.”
2. The online algorithm commits to a probability distribution over {0, 1}, with q(t) denoting the probability
assigned to “1.”
3. The outcome r(t) ∈ {0, 1} is realized.
4. The algorithm incurs a loss of `(q(t), r(t)) and calculates for each expert i a loss of `(p(t)i , r
(t)).
The standard goal in this problem is to design an online prediction algorithm that is guaranteed to have
expected loss not much larger than that incurred by the best expert in hindsight. The classical solutions
maintain a weight for each expert and make a prediction according to which outcome has more expert
weight behind it. An expert’s weight can be interpreted as a measure of its credibility in light of its past
performance. The (deterministic) Weighted Majority (WM) algorithm always chooses the outcome with more
expert weight. The Randomized Weighted Majority (RWM) algorithm randomizes between the two outcomes
with probability proportional to their total expert weights. The most common method of updating experts’
weights is via multiplication by 1− η`(p(t)i , r(t)) after each time step t, where η is the learning rate. We call
this the “standard” or “classical” version of the WM and RWM algorithm.
The classical model instills no agency in the experts. To account for this, in this paper we replace Step 1
of the classical model by:
1a. Each expert i formulates a belief b(t)i ∈ [0, 1].
1b. Each expert i reports a prediction p(t)i ∈ [0, 1] to the algorithm.
Each expert now has two types of loss at each time step — the reported loss `(p(t)i , r
(t)) with respect to the
reported prediction and the true loss `(b(t)i , r
(t)) with respect to her true beliefs.5
When experts care about the weight that they are assigned, and with it their reputation and influence in
the algorithm, different loss functions can lead to different expert behaviors. For example, in Section 2 we
observe that for the quadratic loss function, in the standard WM and RWM algorithms, experts have no
reason to misreport their beliefs. The next example shows that this is not the case for other loss functions,
such as the absolute loss function.6
4More generally, one can investigate how the presence of machine learning algorithms affects data generating processes, either
during learning, e.g. [Dekel et al., 2010, Cai et al., 2015], or during deployment, e.g. [Hardt et al., 2016, Brückner and Scheffer,
2011]. We discuss some of this work in the related work section.
5When we speak of the best expert in hindsight, we are always referring to the true losses. Guarantees with respect to
reported losses follow from standard results [Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, Freund and Schapire, 1997, Cesa-Bianchi et al.,
2007], but are not immediately meaningful.
6The loss function is often tied to the particular application. For example, in the current FiveThirtyEight pollster rankings,
the performance of a pollster is primarily measured according to an absolute loss function and also whether the candidate with the
highest polling numbers ended up winning (see https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/data/tree/master/pollster-ratings).
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Example 1. Consider the standard WM algorithm, where each expert initially has unit weight, and an
expert’s weight is multiplied by 1−η|p(t)i −r(t)| at a time step t, where η ∈ (0, 12 ) is the learning rate. Suppose
there are two experts and T = 1, and that b(1)1 = .49 while b
(1)
2 = 1. Each expert reports to maximize her
expected weight. Expanding, for each i = 1, 2 we have
E[w(1)i ] = Pr(r
(1) = 1) · (1− η(1− p(1)i )) + Pr(r(1) = 0) · (1− ηp(1)i )
= b
(1)
i · (1− η(1− p(1)i )) + (1− b(1)i ) · (1− ηp(1)i )
= b
(1)
i − b(1)i η + b(1)i ηp(1)i + 1− ηp(1)i − b(1)i + b(1)i ηp(1)i
= 2b
(1)
i ηp
(1)
i − p(1)i η − b(1)i η + 1,
where all expectations and probabilities are with respect to the true beliefs of agent i. To maximize
this expected weight over the possible reports p(1)i ∈ [0, 1], we can omit the second two terms (which are
independent of p(1)i ) and divide out by η to obtain
argmax
p
(1)
i ∈[0,1]
2b
(1)
i ηp
(1)
i − p(1)i η − b(1)i η + 1 = argmax
p
(1)
i ∈[0,1]
p
(1)
i (2b
(1)
i − 1)
=
{
1 if b(1)i ≥ 12
0 otherwise.
Thus an expert always reports a point mass on whichever outcome she believes more likely. In our example,
the second expert will report her true beliefs (p(t)2 = 1) while the first will not (p
(t)
1 = 0). While the combined
true beliefs of the experts clearly favor outcome 1, the WM algorithm sees two opposing predictions and
must break ties arbitrarily between them.
This conclusion can also be drawn directly from the property elicitation literature. Here, the absolute loss
function is known to elicit the median [Bonin, 1976][Thomson, 1979], and since we have binary realizations,
the median is either 0 or 1. Example 1 shows that for the absolute loss function the standard WM algorithm
is not “incentive-compatible” in a sense that we formalize in Section 2. There are similar examples for the
other commonly studied weight update rules and for the RWM algorithm. We might care about truthful
reporting for its own sake, but additionally the worry is that non-truthful reports will impede our ability to
get good regret guarantees (with respect to experts’ true losses).
We study several fundamental questions about online prediction with selfish experts:
1. What is the design space of “incentive-compatible” online prediction algorithms, where every expert is
incentivized to report her true beliefs?
2. Given a loss function like absolute loss, are there incentive-compatible algorithm that obtain good
regret guarantees?
3. Is online prediction with selfish experts strictly harder than in the classical model with honest experts?
1.1 Our Results
The first contribution of this paper is the development of a model for reasoning formally about the design and
analysis of weight-based online prediction algorithms when experts are selfish (Section 2), and the definition
of an “incentive-compatible” (IC) such algorithm. Intuitively, an IC algorithm is such that each expert wants
to report its true belief at each time step. We demonstrate that the design of IC online prediction algorithms
is closely related to the design of strictly proper scoring rules. Using this, we show that for the quadratic loss
function, the standard WM and RWM algorithms are IC, whereas these algorithms are not generally IC for
other loss functions.
However, in 2008 FiveThirtyEight used the notion of “pollster introduced error” or PIE, which is the square root of a
difference of squares, as the most important feature in calculating the weights, see https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
pollster-ratings-v31/.
3
Our second contribution is the design of IC prediction algorithms for the absolute loss function with
non-trivial performance guarantees. For example, our best result for deterministic algorithms is: the WM
algorithm, with experts’ weights evolving according to the spherical proper scoring rule (see Section 3), is IC
and has loss at most 2 +
√
2 times the loss of best expert in hindsight (in the limit as T →∞). A variant of
the RWM algorithm with the Brier scoring rule is IC and has expected loss at most 2.62 times that of the
best expert in hindsight (also in the limit, see Section 6).
Our third and most technical contribution is a formal separation between online prediction with selfish
experts and the traditional setting with honest experts. Recall that with honest experts, the classical
(deterministic) WM algorithm has loss at most twice that of the best expert in hindsight (as T → ∞)
Littlestone and Warmuth [1994]. We prove that the worst-case loss of every (deterministic) IC algorithm
(Section 4) and every non-IC algorithm satisfying mild technical conditions (Section 5) has worst-case loss
bounded away from twice that of the best expert in hindsight (even as T →∞). A consequence of our lower
bound is that, with selfish experts, there is no natural (randomized) algorithm for online prediction—IC or
otherwise—with asymptotically vanishing regret.
1.2 Related Work
We believe that our model of online prediction over time with selfish experts is novel. We next survey the
multiple other ways in which online learning and incentive issues have been blended, and the other efforts to
model incentive issues in machine learning.
There is a large literature on prediction and decision markets (e.g. [Chen and Pennock, 2010, Horn et al.,
2014]), which also aim to aggregate information over time from multiple parties and make use of proper
scoring rules to do it. There are several major differences between our model and prediction markets. First,
in our model, the goal is to predict a sequence of events, and there is feedback (i.e., the realization) after each
one. In a prediction market, the goal is to aggregate information about a single event, with feedback provided
only at the end (subject to secondary objectives, like bounded loss).7 Second, our goal is to make accurate
predictions, while that of a prediction market is to aggregate information. For example, if one expert is
consistently incorrect over time, we would like to ignore her reports rather than aggregate them with others’
reports. Finally, while there are strong mathematical connections between cost function-based prediction
markets and regularization-based online learning algorithms in the standard (non-IC) model [Abernethy
et al., 2013], there does not appear to be analogous connections with online prediction with selfish experts.
There is also an emerging literature on “incentivizing exploration” (as opposed to exploitation) in partial
feedback models such as the bandit model (e.g. [Frazier et al., 2014, Mansour et al., 2016]). Here, the incentive
issues concern the learning algorithm itself, rather than the experts (or “arms”) that it makes use of.
The question of how an expert should report beliefs has been studied before in the literature on strictly
proper scoring rules [Brier, 1950, McCarthy, 1956, Savage, 1971, Gneiting and Raftery, 2007], but this
literature typically considers the evaluation of a single prediction, rather than low-regret learning. The work
by Bayarri and DeGroot [1989] specifically looks at the question of how an expert should respond to an
aggregator who assigns and updates weights based on their predictions. Their work focuses on optimizing
relative weight under different objectives and informational assumptions. However, it predates the work on
low-regret learning, and it does not include performance guarantees for the aggregator over time. Boutilier
[2012] discusses a model in which an aggregator wants to take a specific action based on predictions that she
elicits from experts. He explores incentive issues where experts have a stake in the action that is taken by the
decision maker.
Finally, there are many works that fall under the broader umbrella of incentives in machine learning.
Roughly, work in this area can be divided into two genres: incentives during the learning stage, or incentives
during the deployment stage. During the learning stage, one of the main considerations is incentivizing data
providers to exert effort to generate high-quality data. There are several recent works that propose ways to
elicit data in crowdsourcing applications in repeated settings through payments, e.g. [Cai et al., 2015, Shah
and Zhou, 2015, Liu and Chen, 2016]. Outside of crowdsourcing, Dekel et al. [2010] consider a regression
task where different experts have their own private data set, and they seek to influence the learner to learn a
function such that the loss of their private data set with respect to the function is low.
7In the even more distantly related peer prediction scenario [Miller et al., 2005], there is never any realization at all.
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During deployment, the concern is that the input is given by agents who have a stake in the result of
the classification, e.g. an email spammer wishes to avoid its emails being classified as spam. Brückner and
Scheffer [2011] model a learning task as a Stackelberg game. On the other hand Hardt et al. [2016] consider a
cost to changing data, e.g. improving your credit score by opening more lines of credit, and give results with
respect to different cost functions.
Online learning does not fall neatly into either learning or deployment, as the learning is happening while
the system is deployed. Babaioff et al. [2010] consider the problem of no-regret learning with selfish experts
in an ad auction setting, where the incentives come from the allocations and payments of the auction, rather
than from weights as in our case.
1.3 Organization
Section 2 formally defines weight-update online prediction algorithms and shows a connection between
algorithms that are incentive compatible and proper scoring rules. We use the formalization to show that
when we care about achieving guarantees for quadratic losses, the standard WM and RWM algorithms work
well. Since the standard algorithm fails to work well for absolute losses, we focus in the remainder of the
paper on proving guarantees for this case.
Section 3 gives a deterministic weight-update online prediction algorithm that is incentive-compatible and
has absolute loss at most 2 +
√
2 times that of the best expert in hindsight (in the limit). Additionally we
show that the weighted majority algorithm with the standard update rule has a worst-case true loss of at
least 4 times the best expert in hindsight.
To show the limitations of online prediction with selfish experts, we break our lower bound results into
two parts. In Section 4 we show that any deterministic incentive compatible weight-update online prediction
algorithm has worst case loss bounded away from 2, even as T →∞. Then in Section 5 we show that under
mild technical conditions, the same is true for non-IC algorithms.
Section 6 contains our results for randomized algorithms. It shows that the lower bounds for deterministic
algorithms imply that under the same conditions randomized algorithms cannot have asymptotically vanishing
regret. We do give an IC randomized algorithm that achieves worst-case loss at most 2.62 times that of the
best expert in hindsight (in the limit).
Finally, in Section 7 we show simulations that indicate that different IC methods show similar regret
behavior, and that their regret is substantially better than that of the non-IC standard algorithms, suggesting
that the worst-case characterization we prove holds more generally.
The appendix contains omitted proofs (Appendix A), and a discussion on the selecting appropriate proper
scoring rules for good guarantees (Appendix B).
2 Preliminaries and Model
2.1 Standard Model
At each time step t ∈ 1, ..., T we want to predict a binary realization r(t) ∈ {0, 1}. To help in the prediction,
we have access to n experts that for each time step report a prediction p(t)i ∈ [0, 1] about the realization. The
realizations are determined by an oblivious adversary, and the predictions of the experts may or may not
be accurate. The goal is to use the predictions of the experts in such a way that the algorithm performs
nearly as well as the best expert in hindsight. Most of the algorithms proposed for this problem fall into the
following framework.
Definition 2 (Weight-update Online Prediction Algorithm). A weight-update online prediction algorithm
maintains a weight w(t)i for each expert and makes its prediction q
(t) based on
∑n
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i and
∑n
i w
(t)
i (1−
p
(t)
i ). After the algorithm makes its prediction, the realization r
(t) is revealed, and the algorithm updates the
weights of experts using the rule
w
(t+1)
i = f
(
p
(t)
i , r
(t)
)
· w(t)i , (1)
where f : [0, 1]× {0, 1} → R+ is a positive function on its domain.
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The standard WM algorithm has f(p(t)i , r
(t)) = 1 − η`(p(t)i , r(t)) where η ∈ (0, 12 ) is the learning rate,
and predicts q(t) = 1 if and only if
∑n
i w
(t)
i p
(t)
i ≥
∑n
i w
(t)
i (1− p(t)i ). Let the total loss of the algorithm be
M (T ) =
∑T
t=1 `(q
(t), r(t)) and let the total loss of expert i be m(T )i =
∑T
t=1 `(p
(t)
i , r
(t)). The MW algorithm
has the property that M (T ) ≤ 2(1 + η)m(T )i + 2 lnnη for each expert i, and RWM —where the algorithm
picks 1 with probability proportional to
∑n
i w
(t)
i p
(t)
i — satisfies M
(T ) ≤ (1 + η)m(T )i + lnnη for each expert i
[Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994][Freund and Schapire, 1997].
The notion of “no α-regret” [Kakade et al., 2009] captures the idea that the per time-step loss of an
algorithm is α times that of the best expert in hindsight, plus a term that goes to 0 as T grows:
Definition 3 (α-regret). An algorithm is said to have no α-regret if M (T ) ≤ αminim(T )i + o(T ).
By taking η = O(1/
√
T ), MW is a no 2-regret algorithm, and RWM is a no 1-regret algorithm.
2.2 Selfish Model
We consider a model in which experts have agency about the prediction they report, and care about the
weight that they are assigned. In the selfish model, at time t the expert formulates a private belief b(t)i about
the realization, but she is free to report any prediction p(t)i to the algorithm. Let Bern(p) be a Bernoulli
random variable with parameter p. For any non-negative weight update function f ,
max
p
E
b
(t)
i
[w
(t+1)
i ] = maxp
E
r∼Bern
(
b
(t)
i
)[f (p, r)w(t)i ] = w(t)i ·
(
max
p
E
r∼Bern
(
b
(t)
i
)[f (p, r)]
)
.
So expert i will report whichever p(t)i will maximize the expectation of the weight update function.
Performance of an algorithm with respect to the reported loss of experts follows from the standard analysis
[Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994]. However, the true loss may be worse (in Section 3 we show this for the
standard update rule, Section 5 shows it more generally). Unless explicitly stated otherwise, in the remainder
of this paper m(T )i =
∑T
t=1 `(b
(t)
i , r
(t)) refers to the true loss of expert i. For now this motivates restricting
the weight update rule f to functions where reporting p(t)i = b
(t)
i maximizes the expected weight of experts.
We call these weight-update rules Incentive Compatible (IC).
Definition 4 (Incentive Compatibility). A weight-update function f is incentive compatible (IC) if reporting
the true belief b(t)i is always a best response for every expert at every time step. It is strictly IC when
p
(t)
i = b
(t)
i is the only best response.
By a “best response,” we mean an expected utility-maximizing report, where the expectation is with
respect to the expert’s beliefs.
Collusion. The definition of IC does not rule out the possibility that experts can collude to jointly misreport
to improve their weights. We therefore also consider a stronger notion of incentive compatibility for groups
with transferable utility.
Definition 5 (Incentive Compatibility for Groups with Transferable Utility). A weight-update function f is
incentive compatible for groups with transferable utility (TU-GIC) if for every subset S of players, the total
expected weight of the group
∑
i∈S Eb(t)i [w
(t+1)
i ] is maximized by each reporting their private belief b
(t)
i .
Note that TU-GIC is a strictly stronger concept than IC, as for any algorithm that is TU-GIC, the
condition needs to hold for groups of size 1, which is the definition of IC. The concept is also strictly stronger
than that of GIC with nontransferable utility (NTU-GIC), where for every group S it only needs to hold that
there are no alternative reports that would make no member worse off, and at least one member better off
[Moulin, 1999][Jain and Mahdian, 2007].
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2.3 Proper Scoring Rules
Incentivizing truthful reporting of beliefs has been studied extensively, and the set of functions that do this is
called the set of proper scoring rules. Since we focus on predicting a binary event, we restrict our attention
to this class of functions.
Definition 6 (Binary Proper Scoring Rule, [Schervish, 1989]). A function f : [0, 1]× {0, 1} → R ∪ {±∞} is
a binary proper scoring rule if it is finite except possibly on its boundary and whenever for p ∈ [0, 1]
p ∈ max
q∈[0,1]
p · f(q, 1) + (1− p) · f(q, 0).
A function f is a strictly proper scoring rule if p is the only value that maximizes the expectation. The
first perhaps most well-known proper scoring rule is the Brier scoring rule.
Example 7 (Brier Scoring Rule, [Brier, 1950]). The Brier score is Br(p, r) = 2pr − (p2 + (1− p)2) where
pr = pr + (1− p)(1− r) is the report for the event that materialized.
We will use the Brier scoring rule in Section 6 to construct an incentive-compatible randomized algorithm
with good guarantees. The following proposition follows directly from Definitions 4 and 6:
Proposition 8. A weight-update rule f is (strictly) incentive compatible if and only if f is a (strictly) proper
scoring rule.
Surprisingly, this result remains true even when experts can collude.While the realizations are obviously
correlated, linearity of expectation causes the sum to be maximized exactly when each expert maximizes
their expected weight.
Proposition 9. A weight-update rule f is (strictly) incentive compatible for groups with transferable utility
if and only if f is a (strictly) proper scoring rule.
Thus, for online prediction with selfish experts, we get TU-GIC “for free.”It is quite uncommon for problems
in non-cooperate game theory to admit good TU-GIC solutions. For example, results for auctions (either for
revenue or welfare) break down once bidders collude, see [Goldberg and Hartline, 2005] and references therein
for more examples from theory and practice. In the remainder of the paper we will simply us IC to refer
to both incentive compatibility and incentive compatibility for groups with transferable utility, as strictly
proper scoring rules lead to algorithms that satisfy both definitions.
So when considering incentive compatibility in the online prediction with selfish experts setting, we are
restricted to considering proper scoring rules as weight-update rules. Moreover, since f needs to be positive,
only bounded proper scoring rules can be used. Conversely, any bounded scoring rule can be used, possibly
after an affine transformation (which preserves proper-ness). Are there any proper scoring rules that give an
online prediction algorithm with a good performance guarantee?
2.4 Online Learning with Quadratic Losses
The first goal of this paper is to describe the class of algorithms that lead incentive compatible learning.
Proposition 8 answers this question, so we can move over to our second goal, which is for different loss functions,
do there exist incentive compatible algorithms with good performance guarantees? In this subsection we
show that a corollary of Proposition 8 is that the standard MW algorithm with the quadratic loss function
`(p, r) = (p− r)2 is incentive compatible.
Corollary 10. The standard WM algorithm with quadratic losses, i.e. w(t+1)i = (1− η(p(t)i − r(t)))2 · w(t)i is
incentive compatible.
Proof. By Proposition 8 it is sufficient to show that b(t)i = maxp b
(t)
i · (1− η(p− 1)2) + (1− b(t)i ) · (p− 0)2.
7
max
p
b
(t)
i · (1− η(p− 1)2) + (1− b(t)i ) · (1− η(p− 0)2)
= max
p
b
(t)
i − b(t)i ηp2 + 2b(t)i ηp− b(t)i η + 1− b(t)i − ηp2 + b(t)i ηp2
= max
p
1− b(t)i η + 2b(t)i ηp− ηp2
= max
p
1− b(t)i η + ηp(2b(t)i − p)
To solve this for p, we take the derivative with respect to p: ddp1− b(t)i η + ηp(2b(t)i − p) = η(2b(t)i − 2p). So
the maximum expected value is uniquely p = b(t)i .
A different way of proving the Corollary is by showing that the standard update rule with quadratic losses
can be translated into the Brier strictly proper scoring rule. Either way, for applications with quadratic losses,
the standard algorithm already works out of the box. However, as we saw in Example 1, this is not the case
with the absolute loss function. As the absolute loss function arises in practice—recall that FiveThirtyEight
uses absolute loss to calculate their pollster ratings—in the remainder of this paper we focus on answering
questions (2) and (3) from the introduction for the absolute loss function.
3 Deterministic Algorithms for Selfish Experts
This section studies the question if there are good online prediction algorithms for the absolute loss function.
We restrict our attention here to deterministic algorithms; Section 6 gives a randomized algorithm with good
guarantees.
Proposition 8 tells us that for selfish experts to have a strict incentive to report truthfully, the weight-
update rule must be a strictly proper scoring rule. This section gives a deterministic algorithm based on the
spherical strictly proper scoring rule that has no (2 +
√
2)-regret (Theorem 12). Additionally, we consider the
question if the non-truthful reports from experts in using the standard (non-IC) WM algorithm are harmful.
We show that this is the case by proving that the algorithm is not a no (4−O(1))-regret algorithm, for any
constant smaller than 4 (Proposition 13). This shows that, when experts are selfish, the IC online prediction
algorithm with the spherical rule outperforms the standard WM algorithm (in the worst case).
3.1 Deterministic Online Prediction using a Spherical Rule
We next give an algorithm that uses a strictly proper scoring rule that is based on the spherical rule scoring
rule.8 In the following, let s(t)i = |p(t)i − r(t)| be the absolute loss of expert i.
Consider the following weight-update rule:
fsp
(
p
(t)
i , r
(t)
)
= 1− η
1− 1− s(t)i√(
p
(t)
i
)2
+
(
1− p(t)i
)2
 . (2)
The following proposition establishes that this is in fact a strictly proper scoring rule.
Proposition 11. The spherical weight-update rule in (2) is a strictly proper scoring rule.
Proof. The standard spherical strictly proper scoring rule is (1− s(t)i )/
√
(p
(t)
i )
2 + (1− p(t)i )2. Any positive
affine transformation of a strictly proper scoring rule yields another strictly proper scoring rule, see e.g.
8See Appendix B for intuition about why this rule yields better results than other natural candidates, such as the Brier
scoring rule.
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[Gneiting and Raftery, 2007], hence (1− s(t)i )/
√
(p
(t)
i )
2 + (1− p(t)i )2 − 1 is also a strictly proper scoring rule.
Now we multiply this by η and add 1 to obtain
1 + η
 1− s(t)i√(
p
(t)
i
)2
+
(
1− p(t)i
)2 − 1
 ,
and rewriting proves the claim.
In addition to incentivizing truthful reporting, the WM algorithm with the update rule fsp does not do
much worse than the best expert in hindsight. (See the appendix for the proof.)
Theorem 12. The WM algorithm with weight-update rule (2) for η = O(1/
√
T ) < 12 has no (2 +
√
2)-regret.
3.2 True Loss of the Non-IC Standard Rule
It is instructive to compare the guarantee in Theorem 12 with the performance of the standard (non-IC)
WM algorithm. With the standard weight update function f(p(t)i , r
(t)) = 1− ηs(t)i for η ∈ (0, 12 ), the WM
algorithm has the guarantee that M (T ) ≤ 2
(
(1 + η)m
(T )
i +
lnn
η
)
with respect to the reported loss of experts.
However, Example 1 demonstrates that this algorithm incentivizes extremal reports, i.e. if b(t)i ∈ [0, 12 ) the
expert will report p(t)i = 0 and if b
(t)
i ∈ ( 12 , 1] the expert will report 1. The following proposition shows that,
in the worst case, this algorithm does no better than a factor 4 times the true loss of the best expert in
hindsight. Theorem 12 shows that a suitable IC algorithm can obtain a superior worst-case guarantee.
Proposition 13. The standard WM algorithm with weight-update rule f
(
p
(t)
i , r
(t)
)
= 1−η|p(t)i −r(t)| results
in a total worst-case loss no better than
M (T ) ≥ 4 ·min
i
m
(T )
i − o(1).
Proof. Let A be the standard weighted majority algorithm. We create an instance with 2 experts where
M (T ) ≥ 4 · minim(T )i − o(1). Let the reports p(t)1 = 0, and p(t)2 = 1 for all t ∈ 1, ..., T ; we will define b(t)i
shortly. Given the reports, A will choose a sequence of predictions, let r(t) be 1 whenever the algorithm
chooses 0 and vice versa, so that M (T ) = T .
Now for all t such that r(t) = 1, set b(t)1 =
1
2 −  and b(t)2 = 1, and for all t such that r(t) = 0 set b(t)1 = 0
and b(t)2 =
1
2 + , for small  > 0. Note that the beliefs b
(t)
i indeed lead to the reports p
(t)
i since A incentivizes
rounding the reports to the nearest integer.
Since the experts reported opposite outcomes, their combined total number of incorrect reports is T ,
hence the best expert had a reported loss of at most T/2. For each incorrect report p(t)i , the real loss of
expert is |r(t) − b(t)i | = 12 + , hence minim(T )i ≤
(
1
2 + 
)
T/2, while M (T ) = T . Taking  = o(T−1) yields the
claim.
4 The Cost of Selfish Experts for IC algorithms
We now address the third fundamental question: whether or not online prediction with selfish experts is
strictly harder than with honest experts. In this section we restrict our attention to deterministic algorithms;
we extend the results to randomized algorithms in Section 6. As there exists a deterministic algorithm for
honest experts with no 2-regret, showing a separation between honest and selfish experts boils down to
proving that there exists a constant δ such that the worst-case loss is no better than a factor of 2 + δ (with δ
bounded away from 0 as T →∞).
In this section we show that such a δ exists for all incentive compatible algorithms, and that δ depends
on properties of a “normalized” version of the weight-update rule f , independent of the learning rate. This
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implies that the lower bound also holds for algorithms that, like the classical prediction algorithms, use a
time-varying learning rate. In Section 5 we show that under mild technical conditions the true loss of non-IC
algorithms is also bounded away from 2, and in Section 6 the lower bounds for deterministic algorithms are
used to show that there is no randomized algorithm that achieves vanishing regret.
To prove the lower bound, we have to be specific about which set of algorithms we consider. To cover
algorithms that have a decreasing learning parameter, we first show that any positive proper scoring rule can
be interpreted as having a learning parameter η.
Proposition 14. Let f be any strictly proper scoring rule. We can write f as f(p, r) = a+bf ′(p, r) with a ∈ R,
b ∈ R+ and f ′ a strictly proper scoring rule with min(f ′(0, 1), f ′(1, 0)) = 0 and max(f ′(0, 0), f ′(1, 1)) = 1.
Proof. Let fmin = min(f(0, 1), f(1, 0)) and fmax = max(f(0, 0), f(1, 1)) = 1. Then define f ′(p, r) =
f(p,r)−fmin
fmax−fmin , a = fmin and b = fmax − fmin. This is a positive affine translation, hence f ′ is a strictly proper
scoring rule.
We call f ′ : [0, 1]×{0, 1} → [0, 1] a normalized scoring rule. Using normalized scoring rules, we can define
a family of scoring rules with different learning rates η.
Definition 15. Let f be any normalized strictly proper scoring rule. Define F as the following family of
proper scoring rules generated by f :
F = {f ′(p, r) = a (1 + η(f(p, r)− 1)) : a > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1)}
By Proposition 14 the union of families generated by normalized strictly proper scoring rules cover all
strictly proper scoring rules. Using this we can now formulate the class of deterministic algorithms that are
incentive compatible.
Definition 16 (Deterministic Incentive-Compatible Algorithms). LetAd be the set of deterministic algorithms
that update weights by w(t+1)i = a(1 + η(f(p
(t)
i , r
(t))− 1))w(t)i , for a normalized strictly proper scoring rule
f and η ∈ (0, 12 ) with η possibly decreasing over time. For q =
∑n
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i /
∑n
i=1 w
(t)
i , A picks q
(t) = 0 if
q < 12 , q
(t) = 1 if q > 12 and uses any deterministic tie breaking rule for q =
1
2 .
Using this definition we can now state our main result:
Theorem 17. For the absolute loss function, there does not exists a deterministic and incentive-compatible
algorithm A ∈ Ad with no 2-regret.
To prove Theorem 17 we proceed in two steps. First we consider strictly proper scoring rules that are
symmetric with respect to the outcomes, because they lead to a lower bound that can be naturally interpreted
by looking at the geometry of the scoring rule. We then extend these results to cover weight-update rules
that use any (potentially asymmetric) strictly proper scoring rule.
4.1 Symmetric Strictly Proper Scoring Rules
We first focus on symmetric scoring rules in the sense that f(p, 0) = f(1− p, 1) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. We can thus
write these as f(p) = f(p, 1) = f(1− p, 0). Many common scoring rules are symmetric, including the Brier
rule [Brier, 1950], the family of pseudo-spherical rules (e.g. [Gneiting and Raftery, 2007]), the power family
(e.g. [Jose et al., 2008]), and the beta family [Buja et al., 2005] when α = β. We start by defining the scoring
rule gap for normalized scoring rules, which will determine the lower bound constant.
Definition 18 (Scoring Rule Gap). The scoring rule gap γ of family F with generator f is γ = f( 12 ) −
1
2 (f(0) + f(1)) = f(
1
2 )− 12 .
The following proposition shows that for all strictly proper scoring rules, the scoring rule gap must be
strictly positive.
Proposition 19. The scoring rule gap γ of a family generated by a symmetric strictly proper scoring rule f
is strictly positive.
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Proof. Since f is symmetric and a strictly proper scoring rule, we must have that 12f(
1
2 )+
1
2f(
1
2 ) >
1
2f(0)+
1
2f(1)
(since an expert with belief 12 must have a strict incentive to report
1
2 instead of 1). The statement follows
from rewriting.
We are now ready to prove our lower bound for all symmetric strictly proper scoring rules. The interesting
case is where the learning rate η → 0, as otherwise it is easy to prove a lower bound bounded away from 2.
The following lemma establishes that the gap parameter is important in proving lower bounds for IC
online prediction algorithms. Intuitively, the lower bound instance exploits that experts who report 12 will
have a higher weight (due to the scoring rule gap) than an expert who is alternatingly right and wrong with
extreme reports. This means that even though the indifferent expert has the same absolute loss, she will
have a higher weight and this can lead the algorithm astray. The scoring rule gap is also relevant for the
discussion in Appendix B. We give partial proof of the lemma below; the full proof appears in Appendix A.
Lemma 20. Let F be a family of scoring rules generated by a symmetric strictly proper scoring rule f , and
let γ be the scoring rule gap of F . In the worst case, MW with any scoring rule f ′ ∈ F with η ∈ (0, 12 ),
algorithm loss M (T ) and expert loss m(T )i , satisfies
M (T ) ≥
(
2 +
1
dγ−1e
)
·m(T )i .
Proof Sketch. Let a, η be the parameters of f ′ in the family F , as in Definition 15. Fix T sufficiently large
and an integer multiple of 2dγ−1e + 1, and let e1, e2, and e3 be three experts. For t = 1, ..., α · T where
α = 2dγ
−1e
2dγ−1e+1 such that αT is an even integer, let p
(t)
1 =
1
2 , p
(t)
2 = 0, and p
(t)
3 = 1. Fix any tie-breaking rule
for the algorithm. Realization r(t) is always the opposite of what the algorithm chooses.
Let M (t) be the loss of the algorithm up to time t, and let m(t)i be the loss of expert i. We first show that
at t′ = αT , m(t
′)
1 = m
(t′)
2 = m
(t′)
3 =
αT
2 and M
(t′) = αT . The latter part is obvious as r(t) is the opposite of
what the algorithm chooses. That m(t
′)
1 =
αT
2 is also obvious as it adds a loss of
1
2 at each time step. To
show that m(t
′)
2 = m
(t′)
3 =
αT
2 we do induction on the number of time steps, in steps of two. The induction
hypothesis is that after an even number of time steps, m(t)2 = m
(t)
3 and that w
(t)
2 = w
(t)
3 . Initially, all weights
are 1 and both experts have loss of 0, so the base case holds. Consider the algorithm after an even number t
time steps. Since w(t)2 = w
(t)
3 , p
(t)
3 = 1− p(t)2 , and p(t)1 = 12 we have that
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i =
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i (1− p(t)i )
and hence the algorithm will use its tie-breaking rule for its next decision. Thus, either e2 or e3 is wrong.
Wlog let’s say that e2 was wrong (the other case is symmetric), so m
(t+1)
2 = 1 + m
(t+1)
3 . Now at time
t+ 1, w(t+1)2 = (1− η)w(t+1)3 < w(t+1)3 . Since e1 does not express a preference, and e3 has a higher weight
than e2, the algorithm will follow e3’s advice. Since the realization r(t+1) is the opposite of the algorithms
choice, this means that now e3 incurs a loss of one. Thus m
(t+2)
2 = m
(t+1)
2 and w
(t+2)
2 = w
(t+1)
2 and
m
(t+2)
3 = 1 +m
(t+1)
3 = m
(t+2)
2 . The weight of expert e2 is w
(t+2)
2 = aa(1− η)w(t)2 and the weight of expert
e3 is w
(t+2)
3 = a(1− η)aw(t)3 . By the induction hypothesis w(t)2 = w(t)3 , hence w(t+2)2 = w(t+2)3 , and since we
already showed that m(t+2)2 = m
(t+2)
3 , this completes the induction.
Now, for t = αT + 1, ..., T , we let p(t)1 = 1, p
(t)
2 = 0, p
(t)
3 =
1
2 and r
(t) = 0. So henceforth e3 does not
provide information, e1 is always wrong, and e2 is always right. If we can show that the algorithm will always
follow e1, then the best expert is e2 with a loss of m
(T )
2 =
αT
2 , while the algorithm has a loss of M
(T ) = T . If
this holds for α < 1 this proves the claim. So what’s left to prove is that the algorithm will always follow
e1. Note that since p
(t)
3 =
1
2 it contributes equal amounts to
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i and
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i (1 − p(t)i ) and is
therefore ignored by the algorithm in making its decision. So it suffices to look at e1 and e2. The algorithm
will pick 1 iff
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i (1− p(t)i ) ≤
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i , which after simplifying becomes w
(t)
1 > w
(t)
2 .
At time step t, w(t)1 =
(
a(1 + η(f( 12 )− 1))
)αT
(a · (1− η))t−αT and w(t)2 = (a(1− η))
αT
2 a
αT
2 +t−αT .
We have that w(t)1 is decreasing faster in t than w
(t)
2 . So if we can show that w
(T )
1 ≥ w(T )2 for some α < 1,
then e2 will incur a total loss of αT/2 while the algorithm incurs a loss of T and the statement is proved.
This is shown in the appendix.
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As a consequence of Lemma 20, we can calculate lower bounds for specific strictly proper scoring rules.
For example, the spherical rule used in Section 3.1 is a symmetric strictly proper scoring rule with a gap
parameter γ =
√
2
2 − 12 , and hence 1/dγ−1e = 15 .
Corollary 21. In the worst case, the deterministic algorithm based on the spherical rule in Section 3.1 has
M (T ) ≥ (2 + 15)m(T )i .
We revisit the scoring rule gap parameter again in Appendix B when we discuss considerations for selecting
different scoring rules.
4.2 Beyond Symmetric Strictly Proper Scoring Rules
We now extend the lower bound example to cover arbitrary strictly proper scoring rules. As in the previous
subsection, we consider properties of normalized scoring rules to provide lower bounds that are independent
of learning rate, but the properties in this subsection have a less natural interpretation.
For arbitrary strictly proper scoring rule f ′, let f be the corresponding normalized scoring rule, with
parameters a and η. Since f is normalized, max{f(0, 0), f(1, 1)} = 1 and min{f(0, 1), f(1, 0)} = 0. We
consider 2 cases, one in which f(0, 0) = f(1, 1) = 1 and f(0, 1) = f(1, 0) = 0 which is locally symmetric, and
the case where at least one of those equalities does not hold.
The semi-symmetric case. If it is the case that f has f(0, 0) = f(1, 1) = 1 and f(0, 1) = f(1, 0) = 0,
then f has enough symmetry to prove a variant of the lower bound instance discussed just before. Define the
semi-symmetric scoring rule gap as follows.
Definition 22 (Semi-symmetric Scoring Rule Gap). The ‘semi-symmetric’ scoring rule gap µ of family F
with normalized generator f is µ = 12
(
f( 12 , 0) + f(
1
2 , 1)
)− 12 .
Like the symmetric scoring rule gap, µ > 0 by definition, as there needs to be a strict incentive to report
1
2 for experts with b
(t)
i =
1
2 . Next, observe that since f(
1
2 , 0), f(
1
2 , 1) ∈ [0, 1] and f( 12 , 0) + f( 12 , 1) = 1 + 2µ, it
must be that f( 12 , 0) · f( 12 , 1) ≥ 2µ. Using this it follows that:
(
1 + η(f( 12 , 0)− 1)
) (
1 + η(f( 12 , 1)− 1)
)
= 1 + η · (f( 12 , 0) + f( 12 , 1)− 2)+ η2 (f( 12 , 0) · f( 12 , 1)− f( 12 , 0)− f( 12 , 1) + 1)
= 1 + η · (1 + 2µ− 2) + η2 (f( 12 , 0) · f( 12 , 1)− 2µ)
≥ 1− η(1− 2µ) + η2 (2µ− 2µ)
= 1− η + 2µη (3)
Now this can be used in the same way as we proved the setting before:
Lemma 23. Let F be a family of scoring rules generated by a normalized strictly proper scoring rule f , with
f(0, 0) = f(1, 1) and f(0, 1) = f(1, 0). In the worst case, MW with any scoring rule f ′ from F with η ∈ (0, 12 )
can do no better than
M (T ) ≥
(
2 +
1
dµ−1e
)
·m(T )i .
Proof Sketch. Take the same instance as used in Lemma 20, with α = 2dµ
−1e
2dµ−1e+1 . The progression of
the algorithm up to t = αT is identical in this case, as expert e1 is indifferent between outcomes, and
f(0, 0) = f(1, 1) and f(0, 1) = f(1, 0) for experts e2 and e3. What remains to be shown is that the weight of
e1 will be higher at time T . At time T the weights of e1 and e2 are:
a−Tw(T )1 =
(
1 + η(f( 12 , 0)− 1)
)αT
2
(
1 + η(f( 12 , 1)− 1)
)αT
2 (1− η)(1−α)T
a−Tw(T )2 = (1− η)
αT
2 .
12
Similarly to the symmetric case, wee know that w(T )1 > w
(T )
2 if we can show that(
1 + η(f( 12 , 0)− 1)
)dµ−1e (
1 + η(f( 12 , 1)− 1)
)dµ−1e
(1− η) > (1− η)dµ−1e .
By (3), it suffices to show that (1− η + 2µη)dµ−1e (1 − η) > (1− η)dµ−1e, which holds by following the
derivation in the proof of Lemma 20 given in the appendix, starting at (6).
The asymmetric case. We finally consider the setting where the weight-update rule is not symmetric,
nor is it symmetric evaluated only at the extreme reports. The lower bound that we show is based on the
amount of asymmetry at these extreme points, and is parametrized as follows.
Definition 24. Let c > d be parameters of a normalized strictly proper scoring rule f , such that c =
1−max{f(0, 1), f(1, 0)} and d = 1−min{f(0, 0), f(1, 1)}.
Scoring rules that are not covered by Lemmas 20 or 23 must have either c < 1 or d > 0 or both.
The intuition behind the lower bound instance is that two experts who have opposite predictions, and are
alternatingly right and wrong, will end up with different weights, even though they have the same loss. We
use this to show that eventually one expert will have a lower loss, but also a lower weight, so the algorithm
will follow the other expert. This process can be repeated to get the bounds in the Lemma below. The proof
of the lemma appears in the appendix.
Lemma 25. Let F be a family of scoring rules generated by a normalized strictly proper scoring rule f , with
not both f(0, 0) = f(1, 1) and f(0, 1) = f(1, 0) and parameters c and d as in Definition 24. In the worst case,
MW with any scoring rule f ′ from F with η ∈ (0, 12 ) can do no better than
M (T ) ≥
(
2 + max{ 1−c2c , d4(1−d)}
)
·m(T )i .
Theorem 17 now follows from combining the previous three lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 17. Follows from combining Lemmas 20, 23 and 25.
5 The Cost of Selfish Experts for Non-IC Algorithms
What about non-incentive-compatible algorithms? Could it be that, even with experts reporting strategically
instead of honestly, there is a deterministic no 2-regret algorithm (or a randomized algorithm with vanishing
regret), to match the classical results for honest experts? Proposition 13 shows that the standard algorithm
fails to achieve such a regret bound, but maybe some other non-IC algorithm does?
Typically, one would show that this is not the case by a “revelation principle” argument: if there exists
some (non-IC) algorithm A with good guarantees, then we can construct an algorithm B which takes private
values as input, and runs algorithm A on whatever reports a self-interested agent would have provided to A.
It does the strategic thinking for agents, and hence B is an IC algorithm with the same performance as A.
This means that generally, whatever performance is possible with non-IC algorithms can be achieved by IC
algorithms as well, thus lower bounds for IC algorithms translate to lower bounds for non-IC algorithms. In
our case however, the reports impact both the weights of experts as well as the decision of the algorithm
simultaneously. Even if we insist on keeping the weights in A and B the same, the decisions of the algorithms
may still be different. Therefore, rather than relying on a simulation argument, we give a direct proof
that, under mild technical conditions, non-IC deterministic algorithms cannot be no 2-regret.9 As in the
previous section, we focus on deterministic algorithms; Section 6 translates these lower bounds to randomized
algorithms, where they imply that no vanishing-regret algorithms exist.
The following definition captures how players are incentivized to report differently from their beliefs.
9Similarly to Price of Anarchy (PoA) bounds, e.g. [Roughgarden and Tardos, 2007], the results here show the harm of
selfish behavior. Unlike PoA bounds, we sidestep the question of equilibrium concepts and our results are additive rather than
multiplicative.
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Definition 26 (Rationality Function). For a weight update function f , let ρf : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be the function
from beliefs to predictions, such that reporting ρf (b) is rational for an expert with belief b.
We restrict our attention here on rationality functions that are proper functions, meaning that each belief
leads to a single prediction. Note that for incentive compatible weight update functions, the rationality
function is simply the identity function.
Under mild technical conditions on the rationality function, we show our main lower bound for (potentially
non-IC) algorithms.10
Theorem 27. For a weight update function f with continuous or non-strictly increasing rationality function
ρf , there is no deterministic no 2-regret algorithm.
Note that Theorem 27 covers the standard algorithm, as well as other common update rules such as the
Hedge update rule fHedge(p
(t)
i , r
(t)) = e−η|p
(t)
i −r(t)| [Freund and Schapire, 1997], and all IC methods, since
they have the identity rationality function (though the bounds in Thm 17 are stronger).
We start with a proof that any algorithm with non-strictly increasing rationality function must have
worst-case loss strictly more than twice the best expert in hindsight. Conceptually, the proof is a generalization
of the proof for Proposition 13.
Lemma 28. Let f be a weight update function with a non-strictly increasing rationality function ρf , such
that there exists b1 < b2 with ρf (b1) ≥ ρf (b2). For every deterministic algorithm, in the worst case
M (T ) ≥ (2 + |b2 − b1|)m(T )i .
Proof. Fix, f , b1 and b2 such that ρf (b1) ≥ ρf (b2) with b1 < b2. Let pi1 = ρf (b1), pi2 = ρf (b2), b0 = 1− b2+b12 ,
and pi0 = ρf (b0).
Let there be two experts e0 and e1. Expert e0 always predicts pi0 with belief b0. If pi1 = pi2, e1 predicts pi1
(similar to Proposition 13, we first fix the predictions of e1, and will give consistent beliefs later). Otherwise
pi1 > pi2, and expert e1 has the following beliefs (and corresponding predictions) at time t:
b
(t)
1 =
b1 if
w
(t)
0 pi0+w
(t)
1 pi2
w
(t)
0 +w
(t)
1
≥ 12
b2 otherwise
The realizations are opposite of the algorithm’s decisions.
We now fix the beliefs of e1 in the case that pi1 = pi2. Whenever r(t) = 1, set expert e1’s belief to b2, and
whenever r(t) = 0, set her belief to b1. Note that the beliefs indeed lead to the predictions she made, by the
fact that pi1 = ρf (b1) = ρf (b2).
For the case where pi1 > pi2, if (w
(t)
0 pi0 + w
(t)
1 pi2)/(w
(t)
0 + w
(t)
1 ) ≥ 12 then e1’s belief will be b1 leading to a
report of pi1 and as pi1 > pi2 it must hold that (w
(t)
0 pi0 + w
(t)
1 pi1)(w
(t)
0 + w
(t)
1 ) >
1
2 , hence the algorithm will
certainly choose 1, so the realization is 0. Conversely, if (w(t)0 pi0 + w
(t)
1 pi2)(w
(t)
0 + w
(t)
1 ) <
1
2 , then the belief of
e1 will be b2 and her report will lead the algorithm to certainly choose 0, so the realization is 1. So in all
cases, if the realization is 1, then the belief of expert e1 is b2 and otherwise it is b1.
The total number of mistakes M (T ) for the algorithm after T time steps is T by definition. Every
time the realization was 1, e0 will incur loss of b1+b22 and e1 incurs a loss of 1 − b2, for a total loss of
1− b2 + b1+b22 = 1− b2−b12 . Whenever the realization was 0, e0 incurs a loss of 1− b1+b22 and e1 incurs a loss
of b1 for a total loss of 1− b1+b22 + b1 = 1− b2−b12 .
So the total loss for both of the experts is
(
1− b2−b12
) · T , so the best expert in hindsight has m(T )i ≤
1
2
(
1− b2−b12
) · T . Rewriting yields the claim.
For continuous rationality functions, we can generalize the results in Section 4 using a type of simulation
argument. First, we address some edge cases.
Proposition 29. For a weight update function f with continuous strictly increasing rationality function ρf ,
10This holds even when the learning rate is parameterized similarly to Definition 15, as the rationality function does not
change for different learning rates due to the linearity of the expectation operator.
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1. the regret is unbounded unless ρf (0) < 12 < ρ(1); and
2. if ρf (b) = 12 for b 6= 12 , the worst-case loss of the algorithm satisfies M (T ) ≥ (2 + |b− 1/2|)m(T )i .
Proof. First, assume that it does not hold that ρf (0) < 12 < ρf (1). Since ρf (0) < ρf (1) by virtue of ρf being
strictly increasing, it must be that either 12 ≤ ρf (0) < ρf (1) or ρf (0) < ρf (1) ≤ 12 . Take two experts with
b
(t)
1 = 0 and b
(t)
2 = 1. Realizations are opposite of the algorithm’s predictions. Even though the experts
have opposite beliefs, their predictions agree (potentially with one being indifferent), so the algorithm will
consistently pick the same prediction, whereas one of the two experts will never make a mistake. Therefore
the regret is unbounded.
As for the second statement. Since ρf (0) < 12 < ρf (1), there is some b such that ρf (b) =
1
2 . Wlog,
assume b < 12 (the other case is analogous). Since ρf is continuous and strictly increasing, ρf (
b+1/2
2 ) >
1
2
while b+1/22 <
1
2 . Take one expert e1 with belief b
(t) = b+1/22 <
1
2 , who will predict p
(t) = ρf (
b+1/2
2 ) >
1
2 .
Realizations are opposite of the algorithms decisions, and the algorithms decision is consistently 1, due to
there only being one expert, and that expert putting more weight on 1. However, the absolute loss of the
expert is only 12 − |b−1/22 at each time step. Summing over the timesteps and rewriting yields the claim.
We are now ready to prove the main result in this section. The proof gives lower bound constants
that are similar (though not identical) to the constants given in Lemmas 20, 23 and 25, though due to a
reparameterization the factors are not immediately comparable. The proof appears in the appendix.
Theorem 30. For a weight update function f with continuous strictly increasing rationality function ρf ,
with ρf (0) < 12 < ρf (1) and ρf (
1
2 ) =
1
2 , there is no deterministic no 2-regret algorithm.
Theorem 27 now follows from Lemma 28, Proposition 29 and Theorem 30.
6 Randomized Algorithms: Upper and Lower Bounds
6.1 Impossibility of Vanishing Regret
We now consider randomized online learning algorithms, which can typically achieve better worst-case
guarantees than deterministic algoritms. For example, with honest experts, there are randomized algorithms
with worst-case loss M (T ) ≤
(
1 +O
(
1√
T
))
m
(T )
i , which means that the regret with respect to the best
expert in hindsight is vanishing as T →∞. Unfortunately, the lower bounds in Sections 4 and 5 below imply
that no such result is possible for randomized algorithms.
Corollary 31. Any incentive compatible randomized weight-update algorithm or non-IC randomized algorithm
with continuous or non-strictly increasing rationality function cannot be no 1-regret.
Proof. We can use the same instances as for Theorems 17 and 30 and Lemma 28 (whenever the algorithm
was indifferent, the realizations were defined using the algorithm’s tie-breaker rule; in the current setting
simply pick any realization, say rt = 1).
Whenever the algorithm made a mistake, it was because
∑
i w
t
is
t
i ≥ 12
∑
i w
t
i . Therefore, in the randomized
setting, it will still incur an expected loss of at least 12 . Therefore the total expected loss of the randomized
algorithm is at least half that of the deterministic algorithm. Since the approximation factor for the latter is
bounded away from 2 in all cases in Theorems 17 and 30 and Lemma 28, in these cases the worst-case loss of
a randomized algorithm satisfies M (T ) ≥ (1 + Ω(1))m(T )i .
6.2 An Incentive-Compatible Randomized Algorithm for Selfish Experts
While we cannot hope to achieve a no-regret algorithm for online prediction with selfish experts, we can
do better than the deterministic algorithm from Section 3. We now focus on the more general class of
algorithms where the algorithm can make any prediction q(t) ∈ [0, 1] and incurs a loss of |q(t) − r(t)|. We give
a randomized algorithm based on the Brier strictly proper scoring rule with loss at most 2.62 times that of
the best expert as T →∞.
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Perhaps the most natural choice for a randomized algorithm is to simply report a prediction of q(t) =∑n
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i /
∑n
j=1 w
(t)
j . However, this is problematic when the experts are highly confident and correct in
their predictions. By the definition of a (bounded) strictly proper scoring rule, d
dp
(t)
i
f(p
(t)
i , 1) is 0 at 1 (and
similarly the derivative is 0 around 0 for a realization of 0). This means that experts that are almost certain
and correct will not have their weight reduced meaningfully, and so the proof that uses the potential function
does not go through.
This motivates looking for an algorithm where the sum of weights of experts is guaranteed to decrease
significantly whenever the algorithm incurs a loss. Consider the following generalization of RWM that rounds
predictions to the nearest integer if they are with θ of that integer.
Definition 32 (θ-randomized weighted majority). Let Ar be the class of algorithms that maintains expert
weights as in Definition 2. Let b(t) =
∑n
i=1
w
(t)
i∑n
j=1 w
(t)
j
·p(t)i be the weighted predictions. For parameter θ ∈ [0, 12 ]
the algorithm chooses 1 with probability
p(t) =

0 if b(t) ≤ θ
b(t) if θ < b(t) ≤ 1− θ
1 otherwise.
We call algorithms in Ar θ-RWM algorithms. We’ll use a θ-RWM algorithm with the Brier rule. Recall
that s(t)i = |p(t)i − r(t)|; the Brier rule is defined as:
fBr(p
(t)
i , r
(t)) = 1− η
(
(p
(t)
i )
2 + (1− p(t)i )2 + 1
2
− (1− s(t)i )
)
. (4)
Theorem 33. Let A ∈ Ar be a θ-RWM algorithm with the Brier weight update rule fBr and θ = 0.382 and
with η = O(1/
√
T ) ∈ (0, 12 ). A has no 2.62-regret.
The proof appears in the appendix.
7 Simulations
The theoretical results presented so far indicate that when faced with selfish experts, one should use an IC
weight update rule, and ones with smaller scoring rule gap are better. Two objections to these conclusions
are: first, the presented results are worst-case, and different instances are used to obtain the bounds for
different scoring rules. A priori it is not obvious that for an arbitrary (non worst-case) input, the regret
of different scoring rules follow the same relative ordering. It is of particular interest to see if the non-IC
standard weight-update rule does better or worse than the IC methods proposed in this paper. Second, there
is a gap between our upper and lower bounds for IC rules. It is therefore informative to look at different
instances for which we expect our algorithms to do badly, to see if the performance is closer to the upper
bound or to the lower bound.
7.1 Data-Generating Processes
To address these two concerns, we look at three different data-generating processes.
Hidden Markov Model. The experts are represented by a simple two-state hidden Markov model (HMM)
with a “good” state and a “bad” state. We first flip a fair coin to determine the realization r(t). For r(t) = 0
(otherwise beliefs are reversed), in the good state expert i believes b(t)i ∼ min{Exp(1)/5, 1}: the belief is
exponentially distributed with parameter λ = 1, values are rescaled by 15 and clamped between 0 and 1. In
the bad state, expert i believes b(t)i ∼ U[ 12 , 1]. The transition probabilities to move to the other state are 110
for both states. This data generating process models that experts that have information about the event are
more accurate than experts who lack the information.
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Table 1: Comparison of lower bound results with simulation. The simulation is run for T = 10, 000, η = 10−4
and we report the average of 30 runs. For the lower bounds, the first number is the lower bound from
Lemma 20, i.e. 2 + 1dγ−1e , the second number (in parentheses) is 2 + γ.
Beta .1 Beta .3 Beta .5 Beta .7 Beta .9 Brier (β = 1) Spherical
Greedy LB Sim 2.3708 2.3283 2.2983 2.2758 2.2584 2.2507 2.2071
LB Simulation 2.4414 2.3657 2.3186 2.2847 2.2599 2.2502 2.2070
Lem 20 LB 2.33 (2.441) 2.33 (2.365) 2.25 (2.318) 2.25 (2.285) 2.25 (2.260) 2.25 2.2 (2.207)
Lower Bound Instance. The lower bound instance described in the proof of Lemma 20.
Greedy Lower Bound. A greedy version of the lower bound described the proof of Lemma 20. There
are 3 experts, one (e0) who is mostly uninformative, and two (e1 and e2) who are alternating correct and
incorrect. Whenever the weight of e0 is “sufficiently” higher than that of e1 and e2, we have “punish the
algorithm” by making e0 wrong twice: b
(t)
0 = 0, b
(t)
1 = 1, b
(t)
2 =
1
2 , r
(t) = 1, and b(t+1)0 = 0, b
(t)
1 =
1
2 , b
(t)
0 = 1,
r(t) = 1. “Sufficiently” here means that weight of e0 is high enough for the algorithm to follow its advice
during both steps.
7.2 Results
Hidden Markov Model Data. In Figure 1 we show the regret as a function of time for the standard
weight-update function, the Brier scoring rule, the spherical scoring rule, and a scoring rule from the Beta
family [Buja et al., 2005] with α = β = 12 . The expert’s report p
(t)
i for the IC methods correspond to their
belief b(t)i , whereas for the standard weight-update rule, the expert reports p
(t)
i = 1 if b
(t)
i ≥ 12 and p(t)i = 0
otherwise. The y axis is the ratio of the total loss of each of the algorithms to the performance of the best
expert at that time. For clarity, we include the performance of the best expert at each time step, which by
definition is 1 everywhere. The plot is for 10 experts, T = 10, 000, η = 10−2, and the randomized11 versions
of the algorithms (we return to why in a moment), averaged over 30 runs.
From the plot, we can see that each of the IC methods does significantly better than the standard
weight-update algorithm. Whereas the standard weight-update rule levels off between 1.15 and 1.2, all of
the IC methods dip below a regret of 1.05 at T = 2, 000 and hover around 1.02 at T = 10, 000. This trend
continues and at T = 200, 000 (not shown in the graph), the IC methods have a regret of about 1.003, whereas
the regret for the standard algorithm is still 1.14. This gives credence to the notion that failing to account
for incentive issues is problematic beyond the worst-case bounds presented earlier.
Moreover, the plot shows that while there is a worst-case lower bound for the IC methods that rules out
no-regret, for quite natural synthetic data, the loss of all the IC algorithms approaches that of the best expert
in hindsight, while the standard algorithm fails to do this. It curious to note that the performance of all IC
methods are comparable (at least for this data-generating process). This seems to indicate that eliciting the
truthful beliefs of the experts is more important than the exact weight-update rule.
Finally, note that the results shown here are for randomized weighted majority, using the different
weight-update rules. For the deterministic version of the algorithms the difference between the non-IC
standard weight-update rules and the IC ones is even starker. Different choices for the transition probabilities
of the HMM, and different distributions, e.g. the bad state has b(t)i ∼ U[0, 1], give similar results to the ones
presented here.
Comparison of LB Instances. Now let’s focus on the performance of different IC algorithms. First, in
Figure 2 we show the regret for different algorithms on the greedy lower bound instance. Note that this
instance is different from the one used in the proof of Lemma 20, but the regret is very close to what is
obtained there. In fact, when we look at Table 1, we can see that very closely traces 2 + γ. In Table 1 we can
also see the numerical results for the lower bound from Lemma 20. In fact, for the analysis, we needed to
use dγ−1e when determining the first phase of the instance. When we use γ instead numerically, the regret
11Here we use the regular RWM algorithm, so in the notation of Section 6 we have θ = 0.
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Figure 1: The time-averaged regret for the HMM data-generating process.
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Figure 2: Regret for the greedy lower bound instance.
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seems to trace 2 + γ quite closely, rather than the weaker proven lower bound of 2 + 1dγ−1e . By using two
different lower bound constructions, we can see that the analysis of Lemma 20 is essentially tight (up to the
rounding of γ), though this does not exclude the possibility that stronger lower bounds are possible using
more properties of the scoring rules (rather than only the scoring rule gap γ). In these experiments (and
others we have performed), the regret of IC methods never exceeds the lower bound we proved in Lemma 20.
Closing the gap between the lower and upper bound requires finding a different lower bound instance, or a
better analysis for the upper bound.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 12
Let A be the WM algorithm that updates weights according to (2) for η < 12 . Let M
T be the total loss of A
and mTi the total loss of expert i. Then for each expert i, we have
MT ≤ (2 +
√
2)
(
(1 + η)mTi +
lnn
η
)
.
Proof. We use an intermediate potential function Φ(t) =
∑
i w
(t)
i . Whenever the algorithm incurs a loss,
the potential must decrease substantially. For the algorithm incur a loss, it must have picked the wrong
outcome. Therefore it loss |r(t) − t(t)| = 1 and ∑i w(t)i s(t)i ≥ 12 · Φ(t). We use this to show that in those cases
the potential drops significantly:
Φ(t+1) =
∑
i
1− η
1− 1− s(t)i√(
p
(t)
i
)2
+
(
1− p(t)i
)2

 · w(t)i
≤
∑
i
(
1− η
(
1−
√
2
(
1− s(t)i
)))
· w(t)i
(
since min
x
x2 + (1− x)2 = 1
2
)
= (1− η) Φ(t) +
√
2η
∑
i
(
1− s(t)i
)
w
(t)
i
≤ (1− η) Φ(t) +
√
2η
2
Φ(t)
(
since
∑
i
w
(t)
i
(
1− s(t)i
)
≤ 1
2
Φ(t)
)
=
(
1− 2−
√
2
2
η
)
Φ(t)
Since initially Φ0 = n, after M (T ) mistakes, we have:
ΦT ≤ n
(
1− 2−
√
2
2
η
)M(T )
. (5)
Now, let’s bound the final weight of expert i in terms of the number of mistakes she made:
w
(T )
i =
∏
t
1− η
1− 1− s(t)i√(
p
(t)
i
)2
+
(
1− p(t)i
)2


≥
∏
t
(
1− ηs(t)i
) (
since max
x∈[0,1]
x2 + (1− x)2 = 1
)
≥
∏
t
(1− η)s(t)i (since 1− ηx ≥ (1− η)x for x ∈ [0, 1])
= (1− η)
∑
t s
(t)
i
= (1− η)m(T )i
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Combining this with w(t)i ≤ Φ(t) and (5), and taking natural logarithms of both sides we get:
ln
(
(1− η)m(T )i
)
≤ ln
n(1− 2−√2
2
η
)M(T )
m
(T )
i · ln(1− η) ≤M (T ) · ln
(
1− 2−
√
2
2
η
)
+ lnn
m
(T )
i ·
(−η − η2) ≤M (T ) · ln(exp(−2−√2
2
η
))
+ lnn
m
(T )
i ·
(−η − η2) ≤M (T ) · −2−√2
2
η + lnn
M (T ) ≤
(
2
2−√2
)
·
(
(1 + η)m
(T )
i +
lnn
η
)
where in the third inequality we used −η − η2 ≤ ln(1− η) for η ∈ (0, 12 ). Rewriting the last statement proves
the claim.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 20
Let F be a family of scoring rules generated by a symmetric strictly proper scoring rule f , and let γ be the
scoring rule gap of F . In the worst case, MW with any scoring rule f ′ ∈ F with η ∈ (0, 12 ), algorithm loss
M (T ) and expert loss m(T )i , satisfies
M (T ) ≥
(
2 +
1
dγ−1e
)
·m(T )i .
Proof. Let a, η be the parameters of f ′ in the family F , as in Definition 15. Fix T sufficiently large and an
integer multiple of 2dγ−1e+ 1, and let e1, e2, and e3 be three experts. For t = 1, ..., α · T where α = 2dγ
−1e
2dγ−1e+1
such that αT is an even integer, let p(t)1 =
1
2 , p
(t)
2 = 0, and p
(t)
3 = 1. Fix any tie-breaking rule for the algorithm.
Realization r(t) is always the opposite of what the algorithm chooses.
Let M (t) be the loss of the algorithm up to time t, and let m(t)i be the loss of expert i. We first show that
at t′ = αT , m(t
′)
1 = m
(t′)
2 = m
(t′)
3 =
αT
2 and M
(t′) = αT . The latter part is obvious as r(t) is the opposite of
what the algorithm chooses. That m(t
′)
1 =
αT
2 is also obvious as it adds a loss of
1
2 at each time step. To
show that m(t
′)
2 = m
(t′)
3 =
αT
2 we do induction on the number of time steps, in steps of two. The induction
hypothesis is that after an even number of time steps, m(t)2 = m
(t)
3 and that w
(t)
2 = w
(t)
3 . Initially, all weights
are 1 and both experts have loss of 0, so the base case holds. Consider the algorithm after an even number t
time steps. Since w(t)2 = w
(t)
3 , p
(t)
3 = 1− p(t)2 , and p(t)1 = 12 we have that
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i =
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i (1− p(t)i )
and hence the algorithm will use its tie-breaking rule for its next decision. Thus, either e2 or e3 is wrong.
Wlog let’s say that e2 was wrong (the other case is symmetric), so m
(t+1)
2 = 1 + m
(t+1)
3 . Now at time
t+ 1, w(t+1)2 = (1− η)w(t+1)3 < w(t+1)3 . Since e1 does not express a preference, and e3 has a higher weight
than e2, the algorithm will follow e3’s advice. Since the realization r(t+1) is the opposite of the algorithms
choice, this means that now e3 incurs a loss of one. Thus m
(t+2)
2 = m
(t+1)
2 and w
(t+2)
2 = w
(t+1)
2 and
m
(t+2)
3 = 1 +m
(t+1)
3 = m
(t+2)
2 . The weight of expert e2 is w
(t+2)
2 = aa(1− η)w(t)2 and the weight of expert
e3 is w
(t+2)
3 = a(1− η)aw(t)3 . By the induction hypothesis w(t)2 = w(t)3 , hence w(t+2)2 = w(t+2)3 , and since we
already showed that m(t+2)2 = m
(t+2)
3 , this completes the induction.
Now, for t = αT + 1, ..., T , we let p(t)1 = 1, p
(t)
2 = 0, p
(t)
3 =
1
2 and r
(t) = 0. So henceforth e3 does not
provide information, e1 is always wrong, and e2 is always right. If we can show that the algorithm will always
follow e1, then the best expert is e2 with a loss of m
(T )
2 =
αT
2 , while the algorithm has a loss of M
(T ) = T . If
this holds for α < 1 this proves the claim. So what’s left to prove is that the algorithm will always follow
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e1. Note that since p
(t)
3 =
1
2 it contributes equal amounts to
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i and
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i (1 − p(t)i ) and is
therefore ignored by the algorithm in making its decision. So it suffices to look at e1 and e2. The algorithm
will pick 1 iff
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i (1− p(t)i ) ≤
∑3
i=1 w
(t)
i p
(t)
i , which after simplifying becomes w
(t)
1 > w
(t)
2 .
At time step t, w(t)1 =
(
a(1 + η(f( 12 )− 1))
)αT
(a · (1− η))t−αT and w(t)2 = (a(1− η))
αT
2 a
αT
2 +t−αT .
We have that w(t)1 is decreasing faster in t than w
(t)
2 . So if we can show that w
(T )
1 ≥ w(T )2 for some α < 1,
then e2 will incur a total loss of αT/2 while the algorithm incurs a loss of T and the statement is proved.
We have that w(t)1 is decreasing faster in t than w
(t)
2 . So if we can show that at time T , w
(T )
1 ≥ w(T )2 for
some α < 1, then e2 will incur a total loss of αT while the algorithm incurs a loss of T and the statement is
proved. First divide both weights by aT so that we have
a−Tw(T )1 =
(
1 + η(f( 12 )− 1)
)αT
(1− η)(1−α)T
a−Tw(T )2 = (1− η)
αT
2 .
Let α = 2dγ
−1e
2dγ−1e+1 and recall that T = k ·
(
2dγ−1e+ 1) for positive integer k. Thus we can write
a−Tw(T )1 =
(
1 + η(f( 12 )− 1)
)k2dγ−1e
(1− η)k
=
((
1 + η(f( 12 )− 1)
)2dγ−1e
(1− η)
)k
a−Tw(T )2 = (1− η)kdγ
−1e
=
(
(1− η)dγ−1e
)k
So it holds that w(T )1 > w
(T )
2 if we can show that
(
1 + η(f( 12 )− 1)
)2dγ−1e
(1− η) > (1− η)dγ−1e
(
1 + η(f( 12 )− 1)
)2dγ−1e
(1− η) = (1− ( 12 − γ)η)2dγ−1e (1− η) (def. of γ)
≥ (1− η + 2γη)dγ−1e (1− η) (6)
=
(
1− η + 2γη
1− η
)dγ−1e
(1− η)dγ−1e+1
= (1 + 2γη)
dγ−1e
(1− η)dγ−1e+1
≥ (1 + dγ−1e2γη) (1− η)dγ−1e+1
≥ ((1 + 2η) (1− η)) (1− η)dγ−1e
> (1− η)dγ−1e (for η < 12 )
Therefore expert e2 will not incur any more loss during the last stage of the instance, so her total loss is
m
(T )
i = kdγ−1e while the loss of the algorithm is M (T ) = T = k ·
(
2dγ−1e+ 1). So
M (T )
m
(t)
i
≥ k ·
(
2dγ−1e+ 1)
kdγ−1e = 2 +
1
dγ−1e
rearranging proves the claim.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 25
Let F be a family of scoring rules generated by a normalized strictly proper scoring rule f , with not both
f(0, 0) = f(1, 1) and f(0, 1) = f(1, 0) and parameters c and d as in Definition 24. In the worst case, MW
with any scoring rule f ′ from F with η ∈ (0, 12 ) can do no better than
M (T ) ≥
(
2 + max{ 1−c2c , d4(1−d)}
)
·m(T )i .
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Proof. Fix f , and without loss of generality assume that f(0, 0) = 1 (since f is normalized, either f(0, 0)
or f(1, 1) needs to be 1, rename if necessary). As f is normalized, at least one of f(0, 1) and f(1, 0) needs
to be 0. For now, we consider the case where f(0, 1) = 0, we treat the other case later. For now we have
f(0, 0) = 1, f(0, 1) = 0, and by definition 24, f(1, 0) = 1− c and f(1, 1) = 1− d, where c > d (since correctly
reporting 1 needs to score higher than reporting 0 when 1 materialized) and ¬(c = 1 ∧ d = 0) (since that
would put us in the semi-symmetric case).
We construct an instance as follows. We have two experts, e0 reports 0 always, and e1 reports 1 always,
and as usual, the realizations are opposite of the algorithms decisions. Since the experts have completely
opposite predictions, the algorithm will follow whichever expert has the highest weight. We will show that
after a constant number of time steps t, the weight w(t)0 of e0 will be larger than the weight w
(t)
1 of e1 even
though e0 will have made one more mistake. Note that when this is true for some t independent of η, this
implies that the algorithm cannot do better than 2 tt−1 > 2 +
2
t .
While it hasn’t been the case that w(t)0 > w
(t)
1 with m
(t)
0 = m
(t)
1 + 1, realizations alternate, and the weight
of each expert is:
w
(2t)
0 = a
2t(1 + η(f(0, 0)− 1))t(1 + η(f(0, 1)− 1))t
= a2t(1 + η(1− 1))t(1 + η(1− c− 1))t
= a2t(1− cη)t (7)
w
(2t)
1 = a
2t(1 + η(f(1, 1)− 1))t(1 + η(f(1, 0)− 1))t
= a2t(1 + η((1− d)− 1))t(1 + η(0− 1))t
= a2t(1− dη)t(1− η)t (8)
What remains to be shown is that for some t independent of η,
a2t+1(1− cη)t+1 > a2t+1(1− dη)t+1(1− η)t.
We know that it cannot be the case that simultaneously c = 1 and d = 0, so let’s first consider the case
where c < 1. In this case, it is sufficient to prove the above statement assuming d = 0, as this implies the
inequality for all d ∈ [0, c). The following derivation shows that a2t+1(1− cη)t+1 > a2t+1(1− dη)t+1(1− η)t
whenever c(1−c) < t.
a2t+1(1− cη)t+1 > a2t+1(1− dη)t+1(1− η)t
(1− cη)t+1 > (1− η)t (d = 0)
(1− cη) >
(
1− η
1− cη
)t
ln(1− cη) > t · ln
(
1− η
1− cη
)
1− 1
1− cη > t ·
(
1− η
1− cη − 1
)
(1− 1x ≤ lnx ≤ x− 1)
1− cη − 1
1− cη > t ·
(
1− η − 1 + cη
1− cη
)
cη
1− cη < t ·
(1− c)η
1− cη
cη
(1− c)η < t
c
(1− c) < t
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So after 2t+ 1 time steps for some t ≤ c1−c + 1, expert e0 will have one more mistake than expert e1, but
still have a higher weight. This means that after at most another 2t+ 1 time steps, she will have two more
mistakes, yet still a higher weight. In general, the total loss of the algorithm is at least 2 + 1−cc times that of
the best expert. Now consider the case where c = 1 and therefore d > 0. We will show that after 2t+ 1 time
steps for some t ≤ 2 1−dd + 1 expert e0 will have one more mistake than expert e1.
a2t(1− cη)t+1 > a2t(1− dη)t(1− η)t(1− dη)
(1− η)t+1 > (1− dη)t+1(1− η)t (c = 1)
1− η
1− dη > (1− dη)
t
ln
(
1− η
1− dη
)
> t ln(1− dη)
1− 1− dη
1− η > t(1− dη − 1) (1−
1
x ≤ lnx ≤ x− 1)
1− η − 1 + dη
1− η > −tdη
(1− d)η
1− η < tdη
1− d
d
1
1− η < t
2
1− d
d
< t (by η < 12 )
So in any case, after t ≤ 2 max{ c1−c , 1−dd }+ 1 time steps so the loss compared to the best expert is at least
2 + max{ 1−cc , d2(1−d)}.
What remains to be proven is the case where f(0, 1) > 0. In this case, it will have to be that f(1, 0) = 0,
as f is normalized. And similarly to before, by Definition 24, we have f(0, 1) = 1− c and f(1, 1) = 1− d for
c > d and ¬(c = 1 ∧ d = 0). Now, whenever w(t)o > w1(t), e0 will predict 1 and e1 predicts 0, and otherwise
e0 predicts 0 and e1 predicts 1. As usual, the realizations are opposite of the algorithm’s decisions. For now
assume tie of the algorithm is broken in favor of e1, then the weights will be identical to (7), (8). If the tie is
broken in favor of e0 initially, it takes at most twice as long before e0 makes two mistakes in a row. Therefore,
the loss with respect to the best expert in hindsight of an algorithm with any asymmetric strictly proper
scoring rule is
2 + max{ 1−c2c , d4(1−d)}.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 30
For a weight update function f with continuous strictly increasing rationality function ρf , with ρf (0) < 12 <
ρf (1) and ρf ( 12 ) =
1
2 , there is no deterministic no 2-regret algorithm.
Proof. Fix f with ρf (0) < 12 < ρf (1) and ρf (
1
2 ) =
1
2 . Define p = max{ρf (0), 1− ρf (1)}, so that p and 1− p
are both in the image of ρf and the difference between p and 1− p is as large as possible. Let b1 = ρ−1(p)
and b2 = ρ−1(1− p) and observe that b1 < 12 < b2.
Next, we rewrite the weight-update function f in a similar way as the normalization procedure similar to
Definition 15: f(p, r) = a(1 + η(f ′(p, r)− 1)). where max{f ′(p, 0), f ′(1− p, 1)} = 1 and min{f ′(p, 1), f ′(1−
p, 0)} = 0. Again we do this to prove bounds that are not dependent on any learning rate parameter.
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Note that the composition of ρf and f , namely f(ρf (p), r) is a strictly proper scoring rule, since it
changes the prediction in the same way as the selfish expert would do. Since f(ρf (p), r), it must also be that
f ′(ρf (p), r) is a strictly proper scoring rule, since it is a positive affine transformation of f ◦ ρf .12
We now continue similarly to the lower bounds in Section 4. We only treat the semi-symmetric and
asymmetric cases as the former includes the special case of the symmetric weight-update function.
For the semi-symmetric case, by definition f ′(ρf (b1), 0) = f ′(ρf (b2), 1) = 1 and f ′(p, 0), f ′(1− p, 1)} = 1
and min{f ′(p, 1), f ′(1− p, 0) = 0. Because f ′ ◦ ρf is a strictly proper scoring rule, the following inequality
holds:
1
2f
′(ρf ( 12 ), 0) +
1
2f
′(ρf ( 12 , 1)) + µ =
1
2f
′(ρf (b1), 0) + 12f
′(ρf ( 12 , 1)) =
1
2
for some µ > 0, since an expert with belief ρf ( 12 ) must have a strict incentive to report this. Here µ plays the
same role as the semi-symmetric scoring rule gap.13
We now pitch three experts against each other in a similar lower bound instance as Lemma 23. For the
first stage, they have beliefs b(t)0 =
1
2 , b
(t)
1 = b1, b
(t)
2 = b2, so they have predictions p
(t)
0 =
1
2 , p
(t)
1 = ρf (b1) = p,
p
(t)
2 = ρf (b2) = 1− p. For the second stage, recall that either b1 = 0 or b2 = 1. In the former case, b(t)0 = 1,
b
(t)
1 = 0, b
(t)
2 =
1
2 and r
(t) = 0 and in the latter case b(t)0 = 0, b
(t)
1 = 1, b
(t)
2 =
1
2 and r
(t) = 1. We now show a
bijection between the instance in Lemma 23 and this instance, which establishes the lower bound for the
semi-symmetric non-incentive compatible case. First of all, note that the weights of each of the experts in the
first stage is the same (up to the choice of a and η, and for now assuming that the algorithms choices and
thus the realizations are the same):
w
(2t)
0 = a
2t
(
(1 + η(f ′( 12 , 0)− 1))((1 + η(f ′( 12 , 1)− 1))
)t
≥ a2t(1− η + 2µη)t (Follows from (3))
w
(2t)
1 = a
2t (1− η))t
w
(2t)
1 = a
2t (1− η))t
In the second stage expert e0 is always wrong and e1 is always right, and hence at time T the weights
Also note, that the predictions of e1 and e2 are opposite, i.e. p and 1− p, so the algorithm will follow
the expert which highest weight, meaning the algorithms decisions and the realizations are identical to the
instance in Lemma 23.
To complete the proof of the lower bound instance, we need to show that the total loss of e1 is the same.
During the first stage, alternatingly the true absolute loss of e1 is b1 and 1− b1, so after each 2 steps, her
loss is 1. During the last stage, since her belief is certain (i.e. b0 if b1 = 0 or b2 if b2 = 1) ans she is correct,
she incurs no additional loss. Therefore the loss of the algorithm and the true loss of e1 are the same as in
Lemma 23, hence the loss of the algorithm is at least 1dµ−1e times that of the best expert in hindsight.
Finally, we consider the asymmetric case. We use a similar instance as Lemma 25 with two experts e0, e1.
If f ′(1− p, 0) = 0 we have b(t)0 = b1 and b(t)1 = b2, so p(t)0 = p and p(t)1 = 1− p, otherwise the beliefs (and thus
predictions) alternate. Again, the predictions are opposite of each other, and the weights evolve identically
(up to the choice of a and η) as before. Again the loss up until the moment that the same expert is chosen
twice in a row is the same.
Once the same expert is chosen twice (after at most 2 max{ c1−c , 1−dd }+ 1) steps), it is not necessarily the
case that the total loss of one expert exceeds the other by 2, as the true beliefs are b1 and b2, rather than 0
and 1. However, since at least either b1 = 0 or b2 = 1, and b1 < 12 < b2, the difference in total absolute loss in
this non-IC instance is at least half of the IC instance, so we lose at most factor 12 in the regret bound, hence
for the asymmetric case M (T ) ≥
(
2 + max{ 1−c4c , d8(1−d)}
)
m
(t)
i , completing the proof of the statement.
12And since f ′ is a positive affine transformation of f , the rationality function is unchanged due to the linearity of the
expectation operator.
13It is defined slightly differently though, as the image of ρf may not be [0, 1].
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 33
Let A ∈ A be a θ-RWM algorithm with the Brier weight update rule fBr and θ = 0.382 and with η ∈ (0, 12 ).
For any expert i it holds that
M (T ) ≤ 2.62
(
(1 + η)m
(T )
i +
lnn
η
)
.
Proof. The core difference between the proof of this statement, and the proof for Theorem 12 is in giving the
upper bound of Φ(t+1). Here we will give an upper bound of Φ(T ) ≤ n · exp (− η2.62M (T )). Before giving this
bound, observe that this would imply the theorem: since the weight updates are identical to the deterministic
algorithm, we can use the same lower bound for Φ(T ), namely Φ(T ) ≥ (1 − η)m(T )i for each expert. Then
taking the log of both sides we get:
lnn− η
2.62
M (T ) ≥ m(T )i · ln(1− η)
lnn− η
2.62
M (T ) ≥ m(T )i · (−η − η2)
M (T ) ≤ 2.62
(
(1 + η)m
(T )
i +
lnn
η
)
So all that’s left to prove is that whenever the algorithm incurs a loss `, Φ(t+1) ≤ exp (− η2.62`). At time t,
the output q(t) of a θ-RWM algorithm is one of three cases, depending on the weighted expert prediction. The
first options is that the algorithm reported the realized event, in which case the `(t) = 0 and the statement
holds trivially. We treat the other two cases separately.
Let’s first consider the case where the algorithm reported the incorrect event with certainty: `(t) = 1. The
means that
∑n
i=1 w
(t)
i s
(t)
i ≥ (1− θ)Φ(t). Since the Brier rule is concave, Φ(t+1) is maximized when s(t)i = 1− θ
for all experts i. In this case each we get
Φ(t+1) ≤
∑
i
(
1− η
(
(p
(t)
i )
2 + (1− p(t)i )2 + 1
2
− (1− s(t)i )
))
w
(t)
i
≤
∑
i
(
1− η
(
(θ)2 + (1− θ)2 + 1
2
− θ
))
w
(t)
i
≤
∑
i
(
1− η
2.62
)
w
(t)
i (since θ = .382)
=
(
1− η
2.62
`(t)
)
Φ(t).
Otherwise the algorithms report is between θ and 1− θ. Let `(t) ∈ [θ, 1− θ] be the loss of the algorithm.
Again, since the Brier rule is concave, Φ(t+1) is maximized when s(t)i = `
(t) for all experts i. On [θ, 1− θ] the
Brier proper scoring rule can be upper bounded by
1− η
fBr(1− θ, 1)/θ s
(t)
i = 1−
η
2.62
s
(t)
i .
This yields
Φ(t+1) ≤
∑
i
(
1− η
(
(p
(t)
i )
2 + (1− p(t)i )2 + 1
2
− (1− s(t)i )
))
w
(t)
i
≤
∑
i
(
1− η
2.62
s
(t)
i
)
w
(t)
i
≤
(
1− η
2.62
`(t)
)
Φ(t)
So the potential at time T can be bounded by Φ(T ) ≤ n ·∏t (1− η2.62`(t)) ≤ n · exp (− η2.62M (T )), from
which the claim follows.
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Figure 3: Three different normalized weight-update rules for r(t) = 1. The line segment is the standard
update rule, the concave curve the Brier rule and the other curve the spherical rule.
B Selecting a Strictly Proper Scoring Rule
When selecting a strictly proper scoring rule for an IC online prediction algorithm, different choices may
lead to very different guarantees. Many different scoring rules exist [McCarthy, 1956, Savage, 1971], and
for discussion of selecting proper scoring rules in non-online settings, see also [Merkle and Steyvers, 2013].
Figure 3 shows two popular strictly proper scoring rules, the Brier rule and the spherical rule, along with the
standard rule as comparison. Note that we have normalized all three rules for easy comparison.
Firstly, we know that for honest experts, the standard rule performs close to optimally. For every δ > 0
we can pick a learning rate η such that as T →∞ the loss of the algorithm M (T ) ≤ (2 + δ)m(t)i , while no
algorithm could do better than M (T ) < 2m(T )i [Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, Freund and Schapire, 1997].
This motivates looking at strictly proper scoring rule that are “close” to the standard update rule in some
sense. In Figure 3, if we compare the two strictly proper scoring rules, the spherical rule seems to follow the
standard rule better than Brier does.
A more formal way of look at this is to look at the scoring rule gap. In Figure 3 we marked the p = 12
location. Visually, the scoring rule gap γ is the difference between a scoring rule and the standard rule
at p = 12 . Since the Brier score has a large scoring rule gap, we’re able to prove a strictly stronger lower
bound for it: the scoring rule gap γ = 14 , hence MW with the Brier scoring rule cannot do better than
M (T ) ≥ (2 + 14 )m(T )i in the worst case, according to Lemma 20. Corollary 21 shows that for the Spherical rule,
this factor is 2 + 15 . The ability to prove stronger lower bounds for scoring rules with larger gap parameter γ
is an indication that it is probably harder to prove strong upper bounds for those scoring rules.
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